%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File     : Zipperpin---2.1.9999
% Problem  : ITP091^1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v7.5.0.
% Transfm  : NO INFORMATION
% Format   : NO INFORMATION
% Command  : python3 /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/portfolio.lams.parallel.py %s %d /export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/tmp.J94xZY8FOm true

% Computer : n006.cluster.edu
% Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory   : 8042.1875MB
% OS       : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit  : 300s
% DateTime : Thu Aug 31 05:22:07 EDT 2023

% Result   : Theorem 1.51s 0.87s
% Output   : Refutation 1.51s
% Verified : 
% SZS Type : Refutation
%            Derivation depth      :   12
%            Number of leaves      :   19
% Syntax   : Number of formulae    :   39 (  15 unt;  14 typ;   0 def)
%            Number of atoms       :   53 (   7 equ;   0 cnn)
%            Maximal formula atoms :    5 (   2 avg)
%            Number of connectives :  167 (   8   ~;  15   |;   0   &; 137   @)
%                                         (   4 <=>;   0  =>;   0  <=;   0 <~>)
%            Maximal formula depth :   10 (   5 avg)
%            Number of types       :    6 (   5 usr)
%            Number of type conns  :    9 (   9   >;   0   *;   0   +;   0  <<)
%            Number of symbols     :   12 (   9 usr;   5 con; 0-2 aty)
%                                         (   3  !!;   0  ??;   0 @@+;   0 @@-)
%            Number of variables   :   18 (   3   ^;  15   !;   0   ?;  18   :)

% Comments : 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
thf(secrecy_specID_type,type,
    secrecy_specID: $tType ).

thf(secrecy_Expression_type,type,
    secrecy_Expression: $tType ).

thf(secrecy_Secrets_type,type,
    secrecy_Secrets: $tType ).

thf(secrecy_KS_type,type,
    secrecy_KS: $tType ).

thf(set_Secrecy_KS_type,type,
    set_Secrecy_KS: $tType ).

thf(localSecrets_type,type,
    localSecrets: secrecy_specID > set_Secrecy_KS ).

thf(q_type,type,
    q: secrecy_specID ).

thf(secrecy_sE_type,type,
    secrecy_sE: secrecy_Secrets > secrecy_Expression ).

thf(member_Secrecy_KS_type,type,
    member_Secrecy_KS: secrecy_KS > set_Secrecy_KS > $o ).

thf(knowle945212990e_know_type,type,
    knowle945212990e_know: secrecy_specID > secrecy_KS > $o ).

thf(secrecy_sKS_type,type,
    secrecy_sKS: secrecy_Secrets > secrecy_KS ).

thf(m_type,type,
    m: secrecy_KS ).

thf(secret_type,type,
    secret: secrecy_Secrets ).

thf(ine_type,type,
    ine: secrecy_specID > secrecy_Expression > $o ).

thf(fact_5_sg6a,axiom,
    ~ ( ine @ q @ ( secrecy_sE @ secret ) ) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl5,plain,
    ~ ( ine @ q @ ( secrecy_sE @ secret ) ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[fact_5_sg6a]) ).

thf(conj_0,conjecture,
    ~ ( member_Secrecy_KS @ ( secrecy_sKS @ secret ) @ ( localSecrets @ q ) ) ).

thf(zf_stmt_0,negated_conjecture,
    member_Secrecy_KS @ ( secrecy_sKS @ secret ) @ ( localSecrets @ q ),
    inference('cnf.neg',[status(esa)],[conj_0]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl355,plain,
    member_Secrecy_KS @ ( secrecy_sKS @ secret ) @ ( localSecrets @ q ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[zf_stmt_0]) ).

thf(fact_1_a2,axiom,
    ( m
    = ( secrecy_sKS @ secret ) ) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl1,plain,
    ( m
    = ( secrecy_sKS @ secret ) ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[fact_1_a2]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl358,plain,
    member_Secrecy_KS @ m @ ( localSecrets @ q ),
    inference(demod,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl355,zip_derived_cl1]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl1_001,plain,
    ( m
    = ( secrecy_sKS @ secret ) ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[fact_1_a2]) ).

thf(fact_8_know_Osimps_I2_J,axiom,
    ! [A: secrecy_specID,M: secrecy_Secrets] :
      ( ( knowle945212990e_know @ A @ ( secrecy_sKS @ M ) )
    <=> ( ( ine @ A @ ( secrecy_sE @ M ) )
        | ( member_Secrecy_KS @ ( secrecy_sKS @ M ) @ ( localSecrets @ A ) ) ) ) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl8,plain,
    ( !!
    @ ^ [Y0: secrecy_specID] :
        ( !!
        @ ^ [Y1: secrecy_Secrets] :
            ( ( knowle945212990e_know @ Y0 @ ( secrecy_sKS @ Y1 ) )
          <=> ( ( ine @ Y0 @ ( secrecy_sE @ Y1 ) )
              | ( member_Secrecy_KS @ ( secrecy_sKS @ Y1 ) @ ( localSecrets @ Y0 ) ) ) ) ) ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[fact_8_know_Osimps_I2_J]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl423,plain,
    ! [X2: secrecy_specID] :
      ( !!
      @ ^ [Y0: secrecy_Secrets] :
          ( ( knowle945212990e_know @ X2 @ ( secrecy_sKS @ Y0 ) )
        <=> ( ( ine @ X2 @ ( secrecy_sE @ Y0 ) )
            | ( member_Secrecy_KS @ ( secrecy_sKS @ Y0 ) @ ( localSecrets @ X2 ) ) ) ) ),
    inference(lazy_cnf_forall,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl8]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl424,plain,
    ! [X2: secrecy_specID,X4: secrecy_Secrets] :
      ( ( knowle945212990e_know @ X2 @ ( secrecy_sKS @ X4 ) )
    <=> ( ( ine @ X2 @ ( secrecy_sE @ X4 ) )
        | ( member_Secrecy_KS @ ( secrecy_sKS @ X4 ) @ ( localSecrets @ X2 ) ) ) ),
    inference(lazy_cnf_forall,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl423]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl425,plain,
    ! [X2: secrecy_specID,X4: secrecy_Secrets] :
      ( ( knowle945212990e_know @ X2 @ ( secrecy_sKS @ X4 ) )
      = ( ( ine @ X2 @ ( secrecy_sE @ X4 ) )
        | ( member_Secrecy_KS @ ( secrecy_sKS @ X4 ) @ ( localSecrets @ X2 ) ) ) ),
    inference('simplify nested equalities',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl424]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl428,plain,
    ! [X2: secrecy_specID,X4: secrecy_Secrets] :
      ( ( ine @ X2 @ ( secrecy_sE @ X4 ) )
      | ( ( knowle945212990e_know @ X2 @ ( secrecy_sKS @ X4 ) )
        = ( $false
          | ( member_Secrecy_KS @ ( secrecy_sKS @ X4 ) @ ( localSecrets @ X2 ) ) ) ) ),
    inference(bool_hoist,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl425]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl429,plain,
    ! [X2: secrecy_specID,X4: secrecy_Secrets] :
      ( ( ine @ X2 @ ( secrecy_sE @ X4 ) )
      | ( ( knowle945212990e_know @ X2 @ ( secrecy_sKS @ X4 ) )
        = ( member_Secrecy_KS @ ( secrecy_sKS @ X4 ) @ ( localSecrets @ X2 ) ) ) ),
    inference('simplify boolean subterms',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl428]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl448,plain,
    ! [X2: secrecy_specID,X4: secrecy_Secrets] :
      ( ( knowle945212990e_know @ X2 @ ( secrecy_sKS @ X4 ) )
      | ~ ( member_Secrecy_KS @ ( secrecy_sKS @ X4 ) @ ( localSecrets @ X2 ) )
      | ( ine @ X2 @ ( secrecy_sE @ X4 ) ) ),
    inference(eq_elim,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl429]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl453,plain,
    ! [X0: secrecy_specID] :
      ( ~ ( member_Secrecy_KS @ m @ ( localSecrets @ X0 ) )
      | ( ine @ X0 @ ( secrecy_sE @ secret ) )
      | ( knowle945212990e_know @ X0 @ ( secrecy_sKS @ secret ) ) ),
    inference('sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl1,zip_derived_cl448]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl1_002,plain,
    ( m
    = ( secrecy_sKS @ secret ) ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[fact_1_a2]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl455,plain,
    ! [X0: secrecy_specID] :
      ( ~ ( member_Secrecy_KS @ m @ ( localSecrets @ X0 ) )
      | ( ine @ X0 @ ( secrecy_sE @ secret ) )
      | ( knowle945212990e_know @ X0 @ m ) ),
    inference(demod,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl453,zip_derived_cl1]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl458,plain,
    ( ( knowle945212990e_know @ q @ m )
    | ( ine @ q @ ( secrecy_sE @ secret ) ) ),
    inference('sup-',[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl358,zip_derived_cl455]) ).

thf(fact_0_not__knowQm,axiom,
    ~ ( knowle945212990e_know @ q @ m ) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl0,plain,
    ~ ( knowle945212990e_know @ q @ m ),
    inference(cnf,[status(esa)],[fact_0_not__knowQm]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl462,plain,
    ine @ q @ ( secrecy_sE @ secret ),
    inference(demod,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl458,zip_derived_cl0]) ).

thf(zip_derived_cl465,plain,
    $false,
    inference(demod,[status(thm)],[zip_derived_cl5,zip_derived_cl462]) ).


%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.12  % Problem  : ITP091^1 : TPTP v8.1.2. Released v7.5.0.
% 0.00/0.13  % Command  : python3 /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/portfolio.lams.parallel.py %s %d /export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/tmp.J94xZY8FOm true
% 0.14/0.35  % Computer : n006.cluster.edu
% 0.14/0.35  % Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.14/0.35  % CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.14/0.35  % Memory   : 8042.1875MB
% 0.14/0.35  % OS       : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.14/0.35  % CPULimit : 300
% 0.14/0.35  % WCLimit  : 300
% 0.14/0.35  % DateTime : Sun Aug 27 11:58:22 EDT 2023
% 0.14/0.35  % CPUTime  : 
% 0.14/0.35  % Running portfolio for 300 s
% 0.14/0.35  % File         : /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.14/0.35  % Number of cores: 8
% 0.14/0.36  % Python version: Python 3.6.8
% 0.14/0.36  % Running in HO mode
% 0.22/0.67  % Total configuration time : 828
% 0.22/0.67  % Estimated wc time : 1656
% 0.22/0.67  % Estimated cpu time (8 cpus) : 207.0
% 0.22/0.71  % /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/lams/40_c.s.sh running for 80s
% 0.22/0.72  % /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/lams/35_full_unif4.sh running for 80s
% 0.22/0.74  % /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/lams/40_c_ic.sh running for 80s
% 0.22/0.75  % /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/lams/15_e_short1.sh running for 30s
% 0.22/0.76  % /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/lams/40_noforms.sh running for 90s
% 1.01/0.79  % /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/lams/40_b.comb.sh running for 70s
% 1.01/0.79  % /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/lams/20_acsne_simpl.sh running for 40s
% 1.01/0.82  % /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/lams/30_sp5.sh running for 60s
% 1.01/0.82  % /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/lams/30_b.l.sh running for 90s
% 1.51/0.86  % /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/lams/35_full_unif.sh running for 56s
% 1.51/0.87  % Solved by lams/15_e_short1.sh.
% 1.51/0.87  % done 31 iterations in 0.098s
% 1.51/0.87  % SZS status Theorem for '/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p'
% 1.51/0.87  % SZS output start Refutation
% See solution above
% 1.51/0.87  
% 1.51/0.87  
% 1.51/0.87  % Terminating...
% 1.74/1.09  % Runner terminated.
% 1.74/1.10  % Zipperpin 1.5 exiting
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------